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Összefoglaló 
 
Nagyobb-e a multinacionális vállalatok piaci ereje a hazai tulajdonban lévő vállalatokénál?  
A 1993 és 2007 közötti magyar vállalati adatok segítségével kimutatjuk, hogy a külföldi 
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az olyan iparágakban, amelyekben nagyobb a hazai vállalatok technológiai lemaradása.  
Ez arra utal, hogy a technológiában megfigyelhető ricardoi különbségek és az endogén 
haszonkulcsok fontos építőelemei lehetnek a külföldi működőtőke-befektetések modelljeinek. 
Egy kanonikus ricardoi modellbe vezetünk be endogén haszonkulcsokat, heterogén 
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haszonkulcsok analitikus eloszlását vezethessük le az empirikus elemzéshez. A modellünk a 
haszonkulcsok különbségének mintegy a felét magyarázza meg. 
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1 Introduction
Local production by multinational firms is twice as large as the volume of exports. Even
in developed countries, multinational enterprises (MNEs) can account for large fractions of
output and employment.1 Because they are such large players in the global marketplace for
both goods and labor, the size of their profits is a subject of lively and constant discussion
among a range of policymakers and pundits. Exactly how big is the profit margin for the
MNE? Although this depends to a large degree on the ability of the firm to charge high
markups over marginal cost, little is known about the extent of this market power or how it
affects their domestically owned competitors.
The purpose of this paper is to (1) provide a theoretical foundation to analyze the degree
of market power held by MNEs versus firms native to the host country and (2) document
the relationship between the markups of MNEs and their domestically owned competitors
using firm-level data. To accomplish this, we innovate within a canonical Ricardian model
of heterogeneous firms and strategic pricing when goods are imperfect substitutes to derive
closed-form distributions of markups. We use these distributions as the foundation for a firm-
level empirical analysis of MNEs’ and native firms’ pricing behavior. Using a large panel of
data for Hungarian firms, we find that multinational firms do, indeed, have greater market
power than domestically owned firms as measured by markups. Further, a technological edge
in multinational firms is correlated with lower markups among their domestic competitors in
the same industry.
The idea that MNE activity results in greater market power is not new, but is almost
entirely unexplored in trade theory and empirics. Thus, our findings are quite new, especially
in the context of manufacturing firms. Perhaps due to the scarcity of firm-level data for
which sufficiently detailed data is available, there is little empirical evidence on the markups
charged by MNEs relative to domestically owned firms in the existing literature. A notable
exception is Sembenelli & Siotis (2008), the only paper of which we are aware that analyzes
1See Kleinert et al. (2012), for instance.
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the markups charged by target firms before versus after a merger in the manufacturing
sector. Using Spanish firm-level data, they find that following acquisition by a foreign firm,
a domestic target increases its markup. The authors attribute this increase in markups to
cost savings arising from improved efficiency after the merger. They characterize these cost
savings as arising from the transfer of superior technology or managerial know-how.
We study markups of foreign-owned firms formed both by mergers and by greenfield FDI.
We use the De Loecker & Warzynski (2012) method to decompose markups from physical
total factor productivity (TFP). First, we demonstrate that MNEs charge higher markups
than domestically owned firms– approximately 19 percent higher for greenfield establishments
and 7.4 percent higher for affiliates established through cross-border mergers and acquisitions
(M&As). We call this a foreign markup premium. A number of studies indicate that MNEs
are, on average, technologically more advanced than their domestic rivals (Temouri et al.
(2008), and Alfaro and Chen (2013) provide new evidence and useful surveys). Using our
measures of physical TFP, we confirm this stylized fact. We observe variation in the degree of
this technological edge across industries, finding that a greater TFP differential is associated
with a higher foreign markup premium.
On the modelling front, path-breaking works by Hymer (1976), Knickerbocker (1973),
Neary (2007), and Mra`zo`va & Neary (2013) conceptualize a world where the decision to
invest overseas achieves higher markups or is principally driven by this motive in a strategic
sense. Models of MNEs with heterogeneous firms (Helpman et al. (2004), Nocke & Yeaple
(2007), Russ (2007), and Ramondo & Rappoport (2010)) characterize MNEs as being more
efficient than the average domestically owned firm, giving them a higher market share as
a result. However, they assume preferences that impose a constant markup, precluding an
examination of market power. De Blas & Russ (2013b) (hereafter DBR) develop a model
of multinational activity with heterogeneity in labor productivity, combined with strategic
pricing, but assume that goods are perfect substitutes to do so, making market share either
zero or one. So the literature can discuss market share in relation to MNEs when firms are
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heterogeneous, but has not yet linked market share to their market power.2
The relationship between the foreign markup premium and TPF differentials that we ob-
serve in the data indicates that Ricardian technological differentials and endogenous markups
are potentially important dimensions of models of foreign direct investment. In this paper,
we draw on the intuition from the models above, but are able to derive, for the first time,
a closed-form distribution of markups in the case where firms are heterogeneous and goods
are imperfect substitutes. This gives us a conceptual foundation for the empirical analysis,
which ultimately demonstrates that for foreign-owned firms in Hungary, having a technolog-
ical advantage goes hand-in-hand with higher markups. In building the model underpinning
the empirical analysis, we advance the current theory of heterogeneous firms and strategic
pricing by presenting analytical distributions for market shares and markups, which in the
studies above either had to be numerically simulated or were degenerate. Although dispersion
in markups in our model is driven almost entirely by differences in technological efficiency,
abstracting from issues such as quality or strategic takeovers, it explains about half of the
markup premium enjoyed by foreign-owned firms in Hungary. In theory, the technological
edge enjoyed by MNEs can arise from scale effects, from strategic takeovers of close rivals,
or from better technology or management. We are agnostic as to what drives the efficiency,
as long as it allows them to charge a lower price than competitors.
Hungary in our sample period provides a rare opportunity to study the differences be-
tween domestic and foreign-owned firms, and especially, to compare firms which were earlier
acquired by foreigners with greenfield multinational affiliates. The majority of privatization
took place in the beginning of the 1990s creating many foreign-owned firms by 1993-94, when
our analysis starts. Liberalization and growth also led to the entry of many greenfield foreign
2Studies of trade with endogenous markups and heterogeneous firms have made this link for exporters.
Recent theoretical models depict high markups and market shares as arising from a technological edge. For
instance, Bernard et al. (2003), Melitz & Ottaviano (2008), Atkeson & Burstein (2008), Rodriguez-Lopez
(2013), and Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2012), as well as Garetto (2012) and De Blas & Russ (2010), all
present models where domestically owned firms’ markups at home and when exporting are increasing in the
efficiency of the firm relative to its competitors. The Ricardian models in this literature all must either be
simulated or rely on the assumption that goods are perfect substitutes within an industry to get a distribution
of markups.
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affiliates in the second half of the 1990s, which we can follow during our period.
It is also useful to study a country in which the level of available technology is quite low
relative to the countries where resident multinationals are headquartered. Although little
evidence is available documenting MNE’s market power in the manufacturing sector, far
more analyses of markups exist related to foreign direct investment in the financial sector
and it points to a similar relationship between technological superiority and higher markups.
Available evidence suggests that (1) net interest margins, similar to the markup, increase
after a cross-border merger, (2) foreign affiliates of banks with parents in rich countries
charge higher markups than domestic banks in poor countries, and (3) foreign affiliates of
banks with parents in less developed countries charge lower markups than domestic banks
in rich countries. All of these stylized facts are consistent with the Ricardian approach to
markups for nonfinancial exporting firms in DBR and banks in De Blas & Russ (2013a), so
we use this modelling framework as a jumping-off point for our model and investigation of
the manufacturing sector, finding ways around a number of technical challenges involved in
deriving closed forms for the distribution of markups when goods are imperfect substitutes.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a model of Bertrand
competition, deriving an analytical distribution of market shares and markups. In Section 3
we describe a comprehensive dataset with the balance sheets of more than 2,500 manufac-
turing firms operating in Hungary in the years 1993-2003. This panel dataset allows us to
calculate firm-year-specific markups. In Section 4, we analyze the data using the empirical
model derived in Section 2 and present the results, concluding in Section 5 with a discussion
of future questions and research.
3In this sense, the world of differentiated and variegated manufactured goods stands in contrast to the case
of the banking sector, where it is perhaps more natural to think of loans with the same terms of repayment
as perfect substitutes.
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2 Theoretical Framework
Suppose that final goods producers in the home country assemble a number of composite
goods within each sector j given a Cobb-Douglas technology so that total output of the final
good Y is given by
Y =
J∏
j=1
Y
βj
j ,
where βj > 0 for all j,
∑
j
βj = 1, and each composite good j uses inputs from a continuum
of industries with measure one. These intermediate inputs are assembled with a constant
elasticity of substitution, η > 1, with Yj given by
Yj =
 j∫
j−1
Y
η−1
η
ij di

η
η−1
.
The corresponding aggregate price index is then a composite of the sectoral price indices,
with the sectoral price indices given by
Pj =
 j∫
j−1
P 1−ηij di

1
1−η
.
Within every single intermediate goods industry i in any sector j, there is a finite number
of firms Kj, each of which produce their own variety. Following Eaton, Kortum, and Sotelo
(2010), we assume that the number of firms with a cost less than or equal to some level c > 0
is Poisson distributed with rate parameter Tjc
θ, Tj > 0, where θ will govern the dispersion of
costs in the population of firms and can be either positive or negative. Note that this implies
the distribution of costs among entrants will be distributed Generalized Gamma(Tj,k, θ
−1),
where k is the rank of the firm in the industry.4.
As in Atkeson & Burstein (2008), output within each intermediate goods industry i is
4Here, we use the notation of Coelho and Mexia (2007)
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governed by the elasticity of substitution between varieties ρ > η,
Yij =
 Kj∑
k=1
q
ρ−1
ρ
ijk

ρ
ρ−1
.
We assume that firms set prices to compete with each other in each sector, paying attention
to how their own prices affect the industry price index in Bertrand competition, with the
industry price index Pij given by
Pij =
 Kj∑
k=1
P 1−ρijk
 11−ρ .
Then, each supplier k of good j will charge a markup over marginal cost according to its
market share sijk,
M(Sijk) =
ε(Sijk)
ε(Sijk)− 1Cijk,
where Cijk represents the marginal cost of a domestically owned firm k within industry i in
sector j, ε(sijk) = ηsijk + ρ(1 − sijk) is the price elasticity of substitution facing each firm,
and sijk is the firm’s market share in the industry. Market share for each home firm k can
be derived as a function of prices,5
Sijk =
P 1−ρijk
R∑
k−1
P 1−ρijk
(1)
Note that the larger the firm is in terms of industry market share, the closer its markup tends
toward the Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) markup, η
η−1 , governed by the elasticity of substitution
between industries, as in Atkeson & Burstein (2008) and later Amiti et al. (n.d.). As market
share shrinks, a firm’s markup also shrinks toward ρ
ρ−1 , the lowerbound governed by the
elasticity of substitution between varieties within an industry.
5See Kucheryavyy (2012) for a full discussion of pricing behavior within this preference structure when
firms are heterogeneous under both Bertrand and Cournot competition.
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2.1 Market share
Within this context, there is a monotonic relationship between a firm’s market share and
its markup—ranking firms by market share is analogous to ranking them by their markups.
Here, we present a way to obtain an analytical distribution for market share and thereby
discern the behavior of the distribution of markups in the closed economy and in the presence
of multinational producers. Although only a finite number of firms, Kj, compete in each
industry, we have a continuum of industries. In each industry, there is a distribution of market
shares. We will derive the distribution across industries of this within-industry distribution.
Thus, our distribution of market shares across industries is a continuous random variable.
2.1.1 Autarky
We start with the observations that (1) many studies in trade treat the distribution of firm
size as resembling a power law and (2) Eaton, Kortum and Sotelo (2010) suggest that the
Dirichlet distribution is a reasonable prior to characterize a distribution of market shares
in an open economy. We take these as our aim. To arrive at that point, we make two
assumptions.
Assumption 1 Intermediate goods prices given the rank k of a firm in industry i of sector
j are distributed Generalized-Gamma(T ′j ,k, θ
−1), T ′j > Tj for all j.
Assumption 2 The dispersion parameter θ equals 1− ρ.
Since ρ > 1, if firms are ranked according to their costs, firms with a worse rank (higher
k) will charge higher prices than better ranked firms when averaging across industries within
a particular sector j. These two assumptions imply that
P 1−ρijk ∼ Gamma
(
T ′j , k
)
. (2)
Given the formula for market shares in Equation 1, this Gamma distribution for output-
weighted prices implies that market shares are distributed Dirichlet(~kj), where ~kj denotes7
the vector of firm rank in any industry (1, 2,...,Kj).
6 We do not specify the form of T ′j
further, as it does not affect the distributions of market shares or markups, which due to
the properties of the Poisson distribution will be governed only by the rate parameter in the
distribution of costs, the firm’s rank, and the number of competitors.
To see this, we note that the marginal density– the distribution of market shares for
a firms with rank k across industries in a particular sector j under autarky is distributed
according to a Beta distribution,7
SCLOSEDijk =
P 1−ρijk
K∑
k=1
P 1−ρijk
∼ Beta
(
k, ||~k|| − k
)
, (3)
where the operator ||~k|| indicates the sum
Kj∑
k=1
k. The power law is a special case of the Beta
distribution. The expected market share for a randomly chosen firm in a randomly chosen
industry i within sector j is given by
E
[
SCLOSEDijk
]
=
k
||~k|| , (4)
which naturally is decreasing in the number of firms in each industry within the particular
sector, Kj. Since the expected market share of any firm is decreasing in the number of rival
firms, and the markup is monotonically increasing in market share, the average markup below
will also be decreasing in this number of rivals.
6See Leemis & McQueston (2008), as well as their interactive website
(http://www.math.wm.edu/ leemis/chart/UDR/UDR.html) for more detail about the relationships
between the Weibull, Exponential, and Gamma distributions. The key thing to note is that Assumption 2
implies that P 1−ρijk is distributed Gamma((T
′
j), k). A firm may only be able to charge a price that results
in a market share close to zero, so this distribution of prices may includes prices for infinitesimally small
producers.
7See again Leemis & McQueston (2008) for the relationship between the Gamma and Beta distribution.
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2.1.2 Competing with multinationals
If multinationals are present, they may set prices based on a distribution of costs that reflects
a greater average efficiency than is available among firms in the host country. Thus their
prices are the realization of a random variable with a lower mean. We assume that the
number of multinationals operating in the home country is also Poisson distributed, but we
embody the superior technology accessible to multinationals operating in the host country
within the parameters T ∗ > Tj and T ′∗ > T ′. Their costs and prices, weighted by the
exponent ρ − 1, again reflect a Generalized Gamma distribution, varying according to rank
among other multinationals and the technology parameter. In this case, too, the market share
of a particular foreign-owned firm taken as the fraction of all foreign-owned firm output is
distributed Dirichlet( ~k∗), where ~k∗ indicates the vector of rankings within the foreign-owned
firms in a particular industry in some sector j, (1, 2, ..., K∗j ). We always refer to rankings
relative firms from the same source country.
In the open economy, we now have a mixture of Dirichlet distributions, a weighted sum
of the distributions among home and foreign-owned firms. Given our Poisson distribution
of firm costs across firms from the same source country, the total number of firms in an
industry with costs no larger than some level c is also Poisson distributed, with rate parameter
T ∗j +Tj, so the fraction of firms in an industry that are home-owned versus foreign-owned is,
respectively, pij =
Tj
Tj+T ∗j
or pi∗j =
T ∗j
Tj+T ∗j
. It is isomorphic to a binomial splitting process, with
the probability of an entrant being a home-owned firm given by pij. Note that the market
shares of firms within home or foreign source groups is independent of this aggregate market
share across the two groups. Thus, we have the marginal distribution of home market shares
in the open economy given by
Sijk =
P 1−ρijk
K∑
k=1
P 1−ρijk
∼ pijBeta(k, ||~k|| − k). (5)
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For foreign-owned firms, this marginal distribution is instead
S∗ijk =
P 1−ρijk∗
Kj+K∗j∑
k′=1
P 1−ρijk′
∼ pi∗jBeta(k∗, || ~k∗|| − k∗). (6)
Though it is less fat-tailed than a power law distribution, the Dirichlet distribution can
reflect very high concentration, depending on the underlying technological parameters. For
our purposes, it is useful to shed light on the behavior of markups.
Our marginal distribution for a home firm’s market share– that is, the distribution of
the market share for some domestically owned firm k in an industry i and sector j, is a
Beta(k, ||~k|| − k, 0, pi) distribution.8 We have assumed for tractability that the technologies
underlying the price-setting behavior by firms, as well as the number of domestic versus
foreign competitors, is identical across industries within a particular sector j. Thus, from
this point we drop the subscript i, so our density for a randomly chosen firm’s market share
can be written as
fSjk(s) =
1
B(k, ||~k|| − k)
(
sk−1(pi − s)||~k||−k−1
pi||~k||−1
)
. (7)
With this marginal distribution, calculating the expected market share of any domestically
owned firm k in the home country is straightforward:
E [Sjk] =
pijk
||~k|| (8)
The expected market share of the home firm is increasing in the level of home technology Tj
and decreasing in the level of foreign technology T ∗j .
Because our theory implies that markups are increasing in market share, we can use the
8See Frigyik et al. (2010) for a discussion of the marginal distribution from a Dirichlet distribution. More
intuitively, the Dirichlet is also known as a multivariate Beta distribution, so its marginal distributions are
naturally Beta (see Johnson & Kotz (1972), Chapter 40). We use the notation for the 4-parameter Beta
distribution given by Johnson et al. (1995), as Beta(p,q,a,b).
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distribution to analyze the expected market share of multinational firms relative to domestic
firms in the host country.9 Similarly, one can see that the market share of the average
multinational is increasing in any technological advantage that the parent country has relative
to the host (home) country,
E [Sjk∗ ] =
pi∗jk
∗
|| ~k∗|| . (9)
The expected market share of an individual foreign-owned firm E [Sjk∗ ] is clearly highest in
host countries with low technology Tj relative to its own source country’s technology T
∗
j .
2.2 Markups
In accordance with our earlier discussion, the markup of a firm with industry rank k in sector
j, Mjk(Sjk), is given by
Mjk =
ηSjk + ρ(1− Sjk)
ηSjk + ρ(1− Sjk)− 1 .
Since the markup is increasing one-to-one in market share, the average markup is also increas-
ing for home firms in the level of home technology, falling in the level of foreign technology.
Being a function of the market share, we can use the probability density for market share,
FSjk(s) derived above, to derive the full distribution of markups for a home-owned firm. More
explicitly, we compute the right-hand side using Equation 7 as
FMjk(µ) =
ρ−[1−µ−1]−1
ρ−η∫
0
fSjk(s)ds.
This produces the cumulative density function
FMjk(µ) = Pr (Mjk ≤ µ) = Pr
(
s ≤ ρ− [1− µ
−1]−1
ρ− η
)
=
B
(
ρ−[1−µ−1]−1
ρ−η , k, ||~k − k||
)
B
(
k, ||~k − k||
) , (10)
9Takeovers (as opposed to greenfield FDI), could have a similar but possibly more muted effect, as it may
leave the total number of firms intact, but increase the technology available to merged firms, leaving the
remaining domestic firms at a disadvantage.
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while the mean does not have a closed form, it is increasing in pi and thus in the level of
home technology relative to foreign.10 The probability that the markup is no greater than
some value m is zero when m is equal to the lowerbound, ρ
ρ−1 and increases continuously in
m, demonstrating the properties of a continuous probability measure for 1 < η < ρ.
Using the same method to derive the cumulative probability distribution for foreign-owned
firms in the home country, FM∗jk(µ) yields
FM∗jk(µ) = Pr
(
M∗jk ≤ µ
)
= Pr
(
0 ≤ s ≤ ρ− [1− µ
−1]−1
ρ− η
)
=
B
(
η[ρ−(ρ−1)µ]
(ρ−η)piµ , k
∗, || ~k∗ − k∗||
)
B
(
k∗, || ~k∗ − k∗||
) ,
(11)
We show that markups for foreign-owned firms on average are higher than their home-owned
competitors in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The expected markup of a foreign-owned firm is higher than that of home-
owned firms in the same industry within a sector j whenever foreign-owned firms originate
in a country with superior technology T ∗j .
Proof. The cumulative probability FM∗j (m) is less than FMj(m) whenever T
∗
j > Tj, the
definition of first-order stochastic dominance.
Thus, foreign-owned firms on average will charge higher markups in industries within sectors
where T ∗j > Tj
DBR suggest that multinationals formed by takeovers might be subject to special tech-
nological hangups that cause their underlying technology to be characterized by a geometric
average of their native and host country technologies. Let TM&Aj be the technology under-
lying the production and pricing behavior of merged firms, with TM&Aj = (T
∗
j )
1−hT hj , where
h between zero and one represents the hangup involved in transferring the parent’s tech-
nology to the acquired firm. Let FMM&Ajk (m) be the cumulative distribution of markups for
10For Cournot competition, the distribution for the markup takes the same form but with the incomplete
Beta parameter given by η[ρ−(ρ−1)µ](ρ−η)piµ rather than
ρ−[1−µ−1]−1
ρ−η .
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these merged firms, which takes the same form as FMjk(m), but substituting T
M&A
j for T
∗
j in
Equation 11. Then, the following corollary follows directly from Proposition 1.
Corollary 4 The expected markup of foreign-owned firms established through mergers and
acquisitions is less than or equal to that of foreign-owned firms established through greenfield
firms whenever there is a technological hangup specific to the cross-border merger.
Proof. FMM&Ajk (m) > FM
∗
jk
(m) whenever h > 0. Thus, the distribution of markups for green-
field firms stochastically dominates that for cross-border acquisitions. Thus, we predict
that acquired foreign affiliates charge markups somewhere between the level of greenfield
establishments and domestically owned firms.11
Not only do foreign firms charge higher markups than their home competitors, but they
put pressure on home firms to reduce their own markups. It is straightforward to show that
competing with rivals from a country with more advanced technological development results
in less market power for native firms in the host market.
Proposition 5 The expected markup of a home-owned firm is decreasing in the level of
technology available to foreign-owned firms T ∗.
Proof. The derivative of the cumulative distribution for the markup, FMjk(m), with re-
spect to T ∗j is positive. Thus, a distribution of home firm markups with a low T
∗
j first-order
stochastically dominates a distribution with a high T ∗j . Proposition 3 implies that a tech-
nological edge among foreign-owned firms squeezes the profit margins of their domestically
owned competitors.
We call the ratio of the expected markup of a randomly chosen foreign firm k∗ to the
expected markup of a randomly chosen home firm in a particular sector j the foreign markup
premium, E[M∗jk]−E[Mjk]. Note that technological spillover or adoption, which would bring
the level of home technologies closer to that of foreign-owned firms (Tj → T ∗j ), would work
to close the gap between foreign and home markups.
11There may be richer competitive effects if the merger affects the number of domestic competitors in the
industry, Kj . We abstract from this complexity, which is explored in more detail in DBR.
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Corollary 6 The foreign markup premium is decreasing in the difference between foreign
and home technologies.
Proof. From Proposition 1, we have that E[M∗] > E[M ] for any foreign-owned firm k∗ and
home firm k whenever T ∗j > Tj. From Equations 10 and 11, we see that
lim
Tj→T ∗j
E[S∗jk]− E[Sjk] = 0,
and firms with identical market shares will charge identical markups in expectation.
While these results are quite intuitive and rooted in observations by Hymer (1976) and
Caves (1974), they have not before been formalized mathematically in a framework with an
arbitrary number of firms producing imperfect substitutes. Thus, our closed-form distribu-
tions are an advance in the theoretical analysis of multinational firms. We use them as a
foundation for our empirical analysis.
3 Data and Empirical Approach
3.1 Data
We use a panel of firm-level dataset collected by the Hungarian Tax Authority, which contains
information on Hungarian firms between 1986 and 2011, but in our main empirical analysis
we restrict the sample to the period between 1995 and 2007 in order to focus on years after
the early phases of transition as well as before the crisis beginning in 2008. The sample
consists of all double-bookkeeping Hungarian enterprises. The data covers balance sheet and
income statements, including sales, exports, material costs, different accounting measures of
capital, the number of employees and 4-digit industry identifier. The data was extensively
cleaned, with a careful attention to harmonizing industry codes across years and filling in
missing observations. Because markup estimates tend to be noisy for very small firms, we
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Year Domestic Acquired Greenfield
1995 1560 416 335
1996 1746 445 406
1997 1900 488 472
1998 2151 513 533
1999 2278 524 540
2000 2412 519 606
2001 2631 534 670
2002 2682 521 712
2003 2622 459 705
2004 2545 425 693
2005 2522 396 706
2006 2443 367 697
2007 2390 356 688
Total 29882 5963 7763
Table 1: Sample size
only include firms with at least 20 employees in our sample12. We restrict our attention to
manufacturing firms.
A key variable in our investigation is the ownership status of each firm. The dataset
includes information on the foreign ownership share in each year. Hence, we classify firms as
foreign-owned when the foreign equity share is at least 10%.13 We also distinguish between
greenfield and acquired firms. First, we can observe whether a firm was acquired by foreigners
after 1986, and we call such enterprises acquired. The second group is that of greenfield firms
which were founded after 1986, and were foreign at the first year of existence. In our sample
all firms were state-owned in 1986, hence we can classify each of them as domestic, privatized
or greenfield.
The number of firms in each category is shown in Table 1. The overwhelming majority of
privatization in manufacturing firms took place before 1995, hence the number of acquired
firms did not change much in our sample period. On the other hand, many domestic and
greenfield firms entered during the dynamic, export-led growth period between 1995 and
2001, followed by a small amount of attrition after 2001.
12But including smaller firms does not affect the results importantly.
13Changing this threshold to 25 or 50% does not affect our results.
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3.2 Estimating markups
We use the method proposed by De Loecker & Warzynski (2012) to estimate both TFP
and markups from the balance sheet data. This method relies on the Ackerberg et al.
(2006) procedure when estimating productivity and estimates markups from the relationship
between the change in input usage and output growth. The intuition is that when competition
is perfect, input shares relative to revenue should equal the elasticity of output with respect
to inputs, while with market power these two quantities deviate. This approach is based on
conditions derived from cost minimization, and does not rely on any specific market structure.
An important assumption of the method is that the firm is able to vary the input in question
freely.
The DLW methodology enables one to estimate the markup in different ways, using
different sets of information. One possibility is to use a value added production function
and identify the markup from the behavior of labor. The second possibility is to estimate
a gross output production function, which provides opportunity to estimate markups from
both material and labor inputs. Because of this richer choice set provided by the gross output
production function, we opt for using the second. The gross output production function for
any firm k in industry i within sector j is:
revenueijkt = βllijt + βκκijkt + βmmijkt + βlllijktt
2 + βκκκ
2
ijkt + βmmm
2
ijkt
+βlκlijktκijkt + βlmlijktmijkt + βκmκijktmijkt + ωijkt + ijkt
(12)
where k denotes firm, i the industry, and j the sector; t indexes years; revenueijkt is gross
output; lijkt is the number of employees, κijkt is tangible assets and mijkt is material costs (all
in logs). The variable ωijkt is the productivity shock observable by the firm in the beginning
of the period while ijkt is an idiosyncratic productivity shock and/or measurement error.
We estimate this translog production function by 2-digit industries.
The gross output function provides an opportunity to estimate markups both from the
choice of materials and labor. One can argue that materials usage is more flexible than labor,
16
hence it may be preferable to use materials to estimate cost efficiency and the corresponding
markup. The formulae for the markups identified from labor (µlijkt) and material use (µ
m
ijkt),
respectively, are:
µlijkt =
λlijkt
αlijkt
and µmijkt =
λmijkt
αmijkt
, (13)
where λlijkt is the firm’s output elasticity for labor, λ
l
ijkt = βˆl + 2βˆlllijkt + βˆlκκijkt + βˆlmmijkt,
while αlijkt is the share of labor costs in revenue (corrected with the idiosyncratic shock).
The estimated output elasticities are quite similar for all firms within each industry, hence
the bulk of identification comes from variation in input spending shares. This, however, may
raise some questions, because there is likely be substitution between labor and materials,
which is not necessarily taken into account in these measures. Furthermore, the degree of
substitution between these inputs may be systematically related to important firm charac-
teristics. First, larger firms may have access to more high quality inputs and are also more
productive, hence they may buy more inputs arm-length rather than producing them them-
selves. Indeed the share of labor compensation in value added is decreasing in firm size,
while the share of materials is increasing (see Figure 1, right pane). Second, multinational
status may also be related to labor share not only because multinationals are larger, but
also because they may be able to import high-quality inputs at a lower costs. Third, trade
liberalization and economic growth may have improved the availability of inputs also led to
an increase in material share over the time period of the sample (see Figure 1, left pane).
The systematic differences between firms in input shares introduces problems when esti-
mating markups with Equation (13). In fact, empirically the two markups measures based
on only labor vs. only materials are negatively correlated, showing that this substitution
between labor and materials dominates the positive correlation coming from the underlying
market power.
In order to increase the robustness of the estimates by reducing bias from this substitution,
17
Figure 1: Input shares
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we calculate a geometric average of the two markups to report in our main regressions and also
report results with different estimated markups as robustness checks. We call this average
the composite markup measure for the firm:
µCOMPijkt =
√
λmijktλ
l
ijkt
αmijktα
l
ijkt
(14)
Note that these methods provide one markup estimate for each firm-year combination.
The estimated markup is a weighted average of the markups in each of the firm’s markets,
hence (without additional assumptions) we cannot estimate separately the markups for the
domestic and foreign market.
3.3 Empirical predictions
We will test four predictions derived in section 2.2. For convenience, we summarize them
here.
• Prediction 1: The expected markup of a foreign-owned firm is higher than that of
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home-owned firms in the same industry whenever foreign-owned firms originate in a
country with superior technology T ∗j .
• Prediction 2: The expected markup of foreign-owned firms established through mergers
and acquisitions is less than or equal to that of foreign-owned firms established through
greenfield activity whenever there is a technological hangup specific to the cross-border
merger.
• Prediction 3: The foreign markup premium is increasing in the difference between
foreign and home technologies. Empirically we will classify industries into two sectors,
one with larger and one with smaller foreign technological advantage, and test whether
foreign markup premium is larger in the former one.
• Prediction 4: The expected markup of a home-owned firm is decreasing in the level
of technology available to foreign-owned firms T ∗j relative to domestic firms Tj. We
will test whether domestic firms have lower markups in the sector with higher foreign
technological advantage.
3.4 Distributions of markups and productivity
The previously described procedure another key characteristics of firm performance in addi-
tion to markups. The procedure includes estimating the revenue productivity or TFP for each
firm (ωijkt + ijkt). In this subsection we provide some descriptive statistics about markups
and TFP.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of these key variables for 2003. In order to make different
industries comparable, we have standardized the variables with 4-digit industry average and
standard deviation. An important property of these distributions is that they are strongly
non-normal, featuring fat tails. This validates the emphasis of our theory on non-normal
distributions of these variables. Even more importantly, in line with Prediction 1, the graphs
show that the markup and revenue productivity distributions of foreign firms stochastically
19
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Figure 2: Distribution of markups and TFP
dominate that of domestic firms. Foreign firms are, on average, more productive and charge
higher markups.
Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of different markups for the three groups of firms. The
top graph shows the composite markup. Its level is around 1.5, and, in line with Proposition 2,
it is highest for greenfield firms followed by privatized and domestic firms. Also, it shows some
convergence because domestic markups increase to similar levels as their foreign counterparts.
Finally, this proxy for markups does not feature any obvious trend.
The remaining two graphs investigate the evolution of alternative markup estimates: the
middle and the bottom graphs show markups identified only from the material and labor use,
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respectively. While the levels of the markups are different, importantly, the ranking of the
three groups of firms is very similar with all three measures, and each measure show some
degree of convergence between domestic and foreign firms. The markups identified from only
one input, however, exhibit trends in line with the trend in input shares.
3.5 Empirical specification
When testing Predictions 1 and 2, we model the estimated markup with variables describing
ownership, productivity, competition and other important determinants of markups. The
estimated equation is:
µCOMPijkt =
∑
f∈{M&A, G}
αf ∗ Ifijkt + β ∗Xijkt + δijt + ζ ijkt (15)
where k indexes firms and t years. The variable µijkt is the estimated markup for the in-
dividual firm k operating within industry i in sector j, Xijkt is the vector of explanatory
variables, δijt is (4-digit) industry-year fixed effects (in our theory, this fixed effect should be
equal for all industries within any sector j, but we allow it to vary across industries within
the sector) and ζ ijkt is the idiosyncratic error. We cluster the standard errors by firm. Our
most important explanatory variables are the set of dummies indicating foreign ownership,
as discussed above.
This strategy identifies the differences in markups between foreign and domestic firms.
In different specifications, we also attempt to understand how much of these differences are
explained by productivity and market share, which are the main drivers of these differences
in the theory.
To capture the technology of the firm, we use the revenue TFP estimate coming from the
De Loecker & Warzynski (2012) process. Note that ’correcting’ this with estimated markups
to calculate physical productivity would lead to endogeneity, because any measurement error
in the markup would show up in the physical productivity measure as well.
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Figure 3: Evolution of different (translog) markup measures
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Market structure is captured with two variables. First, we calculate domestic market
share of the firm in the 2-digit sector j by using Eurostat data on production, imports and
exports. Second, as competition in export markets may differ from domestic competition,
we also include variables representing the proportion of exports relative to the sales of the
firm. Note that this variable may also control for product quality to the extent that firms
producing higher quality goods are more likely to export.
Larger firms may also charge different markups even when controlling for market share.
We add sales quintile dummies reflecting the relative size of the firm in its 2-digit sector.
Note that our identification of the key variables comes mainly from cross-sectional vari-
ation. This is in line with our theoretical approach, which is cross sectional and does not
include entry and exit. A more practical problem with within-firm identification would be
that due to the fact that there are very few changes in firm ownership, it is not possible to
include firm fixed effects or use a matching estimator.
For testing Predictions 3 and 4, we classify each 4-digit industry into one of two sectors:
one with a larger and one with a smaller technology gap. We proxy the technology gap by
calculating the productivity gap between foreign affiliates and domestic firms. In particular
the average markups for 4-digit industry i will be denoted by tfpijt and tfp
∗
ijt for domestic
and foreign firms, respectively. Following this, we calculate the foreign differential in TFP,
the (log) difference between the average productivity of foreign and domestic firms (tfp
∗
ijt −
tfpijt). Finally, we classify 4-digit industries in each year to the sector a large technology
gap when the foreign premium in TFP is larger than the median.
Empirically, being in the sector with large technology gap will be represented by a dummy
variable, highgapijt.
14 Also, for tractability we do not distinguish between acquired and
greenfield firms in this case. In particular, to test Prediction 3, we will estimate the following
regression:
14Note that using a continuous variable representing the TFP gap between foreign- and domestically owned
firms yields very similar results.
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µCOMPijkt = α ∗ foreignijkt + β ∗ highgapijt ∗ foreignijkt + δijt + ζ ijkt (16)
According to Prediction 3, a positive β would indicate the the markup premium of foreign
firms is larger in industries with larger foreign advantage.
When estimating this equation, we use 4-digit industry-year fixed effects, and cluster
standard errors at the firm level. An important issue is that Prediction 3 is about the
distribution of market shares across industries within a sector, hence here one industry,
rather than one firm, represents one observation. Hence we weight observations to generate
the same weight for each industry-year.15
In order to test Prediction 4 about the markups of domestic firms in sectors with different
technology gaps, we add the highgapijt dummy to regression (16). Note that this variable
does not vary within industry-year, hence we can only add industry and year dummies rather
than industry-year dummies. The estimated equation becomes:
µCOMPijkt = α ∗ foreignijkt + β ∗ highgapijt ∗ foreignijkt + γ ∗ highgapijt + ιij + ηt + ζ ijkt (17)
Prediction 4 claims that γ < 0, showing that domestic firms are forced to decrease their
markups in the sector with high technology gap.
When estimating the last two equations, endogeneity can bias estimates either because
of important omitted variables or reverse causality. To see whether this problem is impor-
tant, we also classify industries into high and low-gap categories based on micro-data from
Romania. In particular, we calculate the average labor productivity (revenue/employees) of
domestic and foreign firms for each 3-digit industry-year combination from Romanian firm-
level data and classify each industry into the high- or low gap category based on this. The
idea behind this is that underlying technology gaps across sectors may be similar in the Hun-
15But running the regression at the industry level yields similar results
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garian and Romanian economies, but the endogeneity problems are less likely to be present
when this explanatory variable comes from a different country 16.
4 Results
Table 2 presents averages of key variables. First, there are large differences in terms of
employment. Acquired firms are much larger than domestic firms, and their average size
is more or less constant during the sample period. The average size of domestic firms was
declining before 2001, which is mainly explained by the large number of new entrants in this
dynamic period. The size of greenfield firms is between the domestic and privatized firms on
average. These firms were growing quickly, nearly catching up with acquired firms by the
second half of the 2000s.
The trends in markups reflect the same trends as shown in the previous section.
Finally, in line with earlier results (Brown et al. (2006)), foreign firms are significantly
more productive than domestic firms. In contrast to markups, however, we do not see
convergence between the average TFP of domestic and foreign-owned firms.
4.1 Foreign markup premium
Table 3 presents our baseline results. Column (1) shows the differences across firms when
only controlling for industry-year fixed effects. Greenfield firms have the highest markups:
the point estimate suggests that their premium is close to 20% relative to domestic firms.
Acquired firms’ markups are between domestic and greenfield firms, with a 7.5% point pre-
mium.
In order to see how much of the differences in markups are explained by differences in
productivity, we include TFP in column (2). We use a lagged value to handle simultaneity
problems. TFP has a large and positive coefficient, reinforcing that productivity explains a
16We thank lmos Telegdy for providing us the Romanian data
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Year Employees Markup TFP
Dom. Acqu. Greenf. Dom. Acqu. Greenf. Dom. Acqu. Greenf.
1995 157.21 315.36 172.48 1.43 1.53 1.80 3.04 3.11 3.37
1996 137.70 314.03 168.52 1.42 1.60 1.74 3.05 3.14 3.36
1997 129.94 306.95 185.75 1.42 1.53 1.72 3.04 3.13 3.36
1998 117.14 310.52 193.95 1.36 1.54 1.71 3.06 3.12 3.37
1999 107.82 312.80 213.40 1.39 1.55 1.77 3.05 3.17 3.35
2000 102.54 288.99 216.47 1.33 1.44 1.67 3.04 3.14 3.35
2001 95.18 272.52 235.71 1.37 1.51 1.69 3.12 3.20 3.38
2002 92.00 252.95 226.93 1.38 1.56 1.69 3.12 3.26 3.43
2003 86.09 253.51 228.47 1.40 1.51 1.67 3.10 3.22 3.41
2004 83.31 259.80 230.55 1.35 1.44 1.55 3.08 3.24 3.39
2005 81.13 293.86 236.98 1.37 1.41 1.50 3.07 3.24 3.39
2006 81.52 307.49 247.07 1.34 1.40 1.44 3.06 3.24 3.40
2007 78.43 302.11 252.80 1.32 1.44 1.45 3.08 3.25 3.41
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
large part of markup differences. The coefficients of the multinational variables fall by half,
showing that measured TFP differences pick up about half of differences in markups.
In order to understand better the sources of markup premia of foreign firms, in column
(3) we control for the market share and export status of firms. Market share, besides being
another proxy for the efficiency of the firm, is also important in the more general but less
tractable version of our model where goods within an industry are not perfect substitutes, or
ρ <∞. In this general version of the model, cost efficiencies across firms are fully captured by
their market share, so controlling for market share should reduce or eliminate any difference in
the relative markups charged by foreign versus domestic firms. In line with our expectations
both market share and export status are positively related to markups. Including these
variables reduces the magnitude of the foreign status variables, but the greenfield dummy
still remains significant.
Finally, in column (4) we also include firm size dummies. Again, as expected, firm size
is positively associated with markups. Interestingly, with the inclusion of all these variables
the foreign dummies become insignificant.
All in all, the results suggest that greenfield firms charge higher markups than acquired
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DepVar: Firm Markup (1) (2) (3) (4)
Acquired 0.074*** 0.037** 0.012 -0.022
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Greenfield 0.192*** 0.109*** 0.084*** 0.025
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
TFP (lagged) 0.493*** 0.519*** 0.540***
(0.064) (0.061) (0.063)
Market share 0.458*** 0.229***
(0.047) (0.049)
Exporter 0.040*** -0.028**
(0.011) (0.012)
Size: 2nd q. 0.096***
(0.011)
Size: 3rd q. 0.181***
(0.014)
Size: 4rd q. 0.235***
(0.017)
Size: 5th q. 0.297***
(0.022)
Observations 35,378 35,378 35,378 35,378
R-squared 0.315 0.357 0.372 0.395
Table 3: Baseline results
foreign firms, while domestic firms charge lower markups even than acquired foreign firms.
This difference is mostly explained by the higher productivity, market share and size of foreign
affiliates.
4.2 Robustness
Table 4 presents our baseline results with other markup measures as dependent variables.
Columns (1) and (2) present results with the markup estimated only from material use,
Columns (3) and (4) show results when the markup is identified from only the labor variable.
In columns (5) and (6) we estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function instead of the
translog in our baseline model and use the composite markup.
Importantly, the point estimates for the two multinational variables are very similar to the
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DepVar: Firm Markup material material labor labor composite composite
TL TL TL TL CD CD
Acquired 0.051* 0.038 0.161*** 0.034 0.080*** 0.038**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.048) (0.046) (0.015) (0.015)
Greenfield 0.159*** 0.130*** 0.317*** 0.038 0.203*** 0.109***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.058) (0.058) (0.019) (0.019)
TFP (lagged) 0.171*** 1.678*** 0.551***
(0.053) (0.110) (0.044)
Observations 35,389 35,389 34,435 34,435 35,378 35,378
R-squared 0.193 0.194 0.279 0.324 0.378 0.422
Table 4: Results with different markup estimators
previous estimates: the premium for greenfield firms is between 20 and 30 percentage points
while that of privatized firms is somewhat smaller. As before, differences in productivity
explain a large deal from these raw differences.
An important concern may be that our theoretical framework is based on developments
in the domestic market while many firms producing in Hungary may mainly aim export
markets. Indeed, about a third of the firms in our sample export more than half of their
production. To see whether this affects our results importantly Table 5 restricts our sample
to firms which sell at least 50% of their production in the domestic market. The results are
very similar to the baseline table.
Table 6 shows additional robustness checks. In columns (1) and (2) we split the sample
into two subperiods: 1995-2000 and 2001-2007, respectively. This sample split suggests that
foreign premia were significant in both periods; also, greenfield firms charged higher markups
in both periods than acquired firms. The premia, however, are somewhat smaller in the later
period, in line with the descriptive statistics. This robustness check provides evidence that
the patterns we observe are not only a characteristic of a transition period: transition was
over by 2000, hence these patterns should be more general.
An important question is whether our results are driven by composition effects or within-
firm changes in markups. To focus on firms which were present in the sample for a long term,
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DepVar: Firm Markup (1) (2) (3) (4)
Acquired 0.080*** 0.053*** 0.020 -0.013
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Greenfield 0.228*** 0.141*** 0.075** 0.022
(0.027) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
TFP (lagged) 0.421*** 0.455*** 0.469***
(0.089) (0.086) (0.088)
Market share 0.517*** 0.206***
(0.059) (0.064)
Exporter 0.025** -0.044***
(0.012) (0.012)
Size: 2nd q. 0.107***
(0.012)
Size: 3rd q. 0.220***
(0.016)
Size: 4rd q. 0.292***
(0.020)
Size: 5th q. 0.325***
(0.030)
Observations 24,991 24,991 24,991 24,991
R-squared 0.380 0.407 0.422 0.451
Table 5: Results with firms with and export share below 50%
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in column (3) we restrict the sample to firms with at least 10 observations. While the much
smaller sample size leads to less precise estimates, the estimate for greenfield firms is similar
to the previous results, while the acquired variable becomes insignificant.
In column (4) we exclude firms with less than 50 employees. One motivation for this is
that balance sheet data by smaller firms may be less reliable, hence markup estimates for
these firms may be more noisy. This restriction, however, does not change the qualitative
results. 17
Column (5) and (6) includes three variables which may be related both to foreign status
and markups. First, foreign firms are likely to pay higher wages. To check the importance
of wage differences, we calculate 5 quintile dummies reflecting the average wage paid by the
firm relative to the industry average. Second, it is likely that effective tax rates are different
between the foreign and domestic firms, because of tax concessions or different tax morale.
To control for the differences in tax rates, we calculate the effective tax rate for each firm
by dividing the corporate tax bill with before tax earnings. The estimates show that firms
that pay higher wages have lower markups. Finally, we control for import penetration at the
industry-year level to capture another dimension of competition.
Importantly, while the signs of these new variables are similar to our expectations, they
do not affect the estimates of our main variables. The only exception is the inclusion of
wages, which lead to a positive and significant greenfield premium even when we control for
productivity and market size. Different strategies when paying wages may play an important
role in the different markups of domestic and foreign firms.
4.3 The role of the difference in technology
Predictions 3 and 4 are statements regarding the relationship between the markup premium
and the differences in technology gap across sectors.
Table 7 shows the results from this exercise. Columns (1) and (3) estimate equation (16)
17This is also true when we also restrict the productivity and markups estimation to this subsample of
firms
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DepVar: Firm Markup 1995-2000 2001-2007 balanced emp>50 tax wage imp. comp.
Acquired 0.093*** 0.064*** 0.015 0.078*** 0.087*** 0.010
(0.017) (0.017) (0.057) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015)
Greenfield 0.247*** 0.165*** 0.179** 0.210*** 0.203*** 0.067***
(0.024) (0.020) (0.082) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021)
Wage: 2nd q. -0.130*** -0.168***
(0.016) (0.014)
Wage: 3rd q. -0.175*** -0.255***
(0.016) (0.015)
Wage: 4rd q. -0.167*** -0.304***
(0.018) (0.018)
Wage: 5th q. -0.098*** -0.328***
(0.020) (0.021)
Tax rate 0.002 0.002**
(0.002) (0.001)
Imp share 0.019 0.118
(0.157) (0.175)
TFP (lagged) 0.565***
(0.071)
Market share 0.282***
(0.051)
Exporter -0.018
(0.011)
Size: 2nd q. 0.147***
(0.012)
Size: 3rd q. 0.258***
(0.015)
Size: 4rd q. 0.346***
(0.019)
Size: 5th q. 0.450***
(0.025)
Observations 12,677 22,701 2,776 19,592 32,513 32,513
R-squared 0.315 0.316 0.652 0.389 0.327 0.431
Table 6: Robustness checks
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DepVar: Firm Markup (1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign 0.086*** 0.079*** 0.072** 0.075**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.034) (0.029)
Foreign*highgap 0.105*** 0.095*** 0.062* 0.089**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.037) (0.035)
highgap -0.056*** -0.052***
(0.017) (0.018)
TFP (lagged) 0.233 0.047
(0.194) (0.129)
industry-year FE yes no yes no
industry FE no yes no yes
year FE no yes no yes
Observations 35,378 35,378 35,378 35,378
R-squared 0.618 0.530 0.625 0.530
Table 7: The difference in markups across sectors
while in columns (2) and (4) we also add the sector dummy as in equation (17).
First, the results are much in line with Prediction 3. The foreign markup premium more
than 8 percentage points in the sector with smaller technology gap, while it is around 20
percent in the sectors with larger technology difference. Also, controlling for firm-level TFP
leads to only a small decrease in these coefficients.
Columns (2) and (4) also support Prediction 4. Domestic markups in the sector with large
technology gap are more than 5 percentage points lower than in the sector with a smaller
technology gap. This suggests that entry of more efficient foreign firms leads to a fall in
domestic markups.
As it was mentioned previously, these results equations may yield biased estimates because
the average TFP difference between domestic and foreign-owned firms may be endogenous. In
Table 8 we replace the highgap variable with the one calculated from Romanian micro-data.
The results are very similar to the previous table.
For a robustness check, in Table 9 we re-run the previous regressions with the alternative
markup measures, which exercise yields similar results.
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DepVar: Firm Markup (1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign 0.077*** 0.085*** 0.041 0.075**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.045) (0.036)
Foreign*highgap 0.116*** 0.081*** 0.114*** 0.079***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
highgap -0.047*** -0.046***
(0.015) (0.015)
TFP (lagged) 0.238 0.077
(0.202) (0.139)
industry-year FE yes no yes no
industry FE no yes no yes
year FE no yes no yes
Observations 34,619 34,619 34,619 34,619
R-squared 0.571 0.476 0.578 0.478
Table 8: The difference in markups across sectors using the measure from Romanian data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DepVar: Firm Markup material material labor labor composite composite
TL TL TL TL CD CD
Foreign 0.058* 0.065* 0.062 0.069 0.072*** 0.069***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.081) (0.078) (0.024) (0.024)
Foreign*highgap 0.083* 0.056 0.338*** 0.271*** 0.142*** 0.115***
(0.047) (0.045) (0.093) (0.086) (0.029) (0.027)
highgap -0.067** -0.177*** -0.074***
(0.027) (0.056) (0.017)
industry-year FE yes no yes no yes no
industry FE no yes no yes no yes
year FE no yes no yes no yes
Observations 35,389 35,389 34,435 34,435 35,378 35,378
R-squared 0.396 0.299 0.494 0.386 0.598 0.513
Table 9: The difference in markups across sectors, different markup measures
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5 Conclusion
We used a structural model of endogenous markups and heterogeneous firms to derive pre-
dictions about the differences in markups of domestic and foreign-owned firms. The model
draws from intuition within Ricardian models of trade and FDI (specifically, Bernard et al.
(2003), Atkeson & Burstein (2008), and De Blas & Russ (2013b)). We consider the Ricardian
framework important to capture the relationships we observe in the data between markups
and TFP differentials between foreign- and domestically owned firms in the existing literature
and which we confirm in our own empirical analysis. We start from a distribution of prices
rather than costs, which enables us to derive for the first time analytical distributions for
market shares and markups in a setting with Bertrand competition when goods are imperfect
substitutes. The distributions highlight the role of technology in governing market power.
This model motivates our analysis of Hungarian firm-level data. We show that markups
for foreign-owned firms are higher in general that for domestic firms, especially greenfield
firms. Perhaps most interestingly, a technological edge among foreign-owned firms in an
industry is associated with lower markups for domestic competitors. Domestically owned
firms competing in industries where foreign-owned firms have a TFP differential above the
median charge a markup approximately 5 percent lower, on average, than domestic firms in
other industries. Markups for foreign-owned firms in industries with a TFP differential above
the median charge a markup between 6 and 10 percent higher than foreign-owned firms in
other industries.
In summary, the model and results (1) underscore the usefulness of considering FDI be-
tween countries with differing levels of technology within a Ricardian framework and (2) es-
tablish that the entry of foreign-owned firms can have nontrivial effects on the profit margins
of domestic competitors in some markets with low levels of entry or technological develop-
ment.
34
References
Ackerberg, D., Caves, K. & Frazer, G. (2006), ‘Structural identification of production func-
tions’, Unpublished .
Amiti, M., Itskhoki, O. & K onings, J. (n.d.), ‘Importers, exporters, and exchange rate
disconnect’, (forthcoming) American Economic Review .
Atkeson, A. & Burstein, A. (2008), ‘Pricing-to-market, trade costs, and international relative
prices’, American Economic Review 98(5), 1998–2031.
Bernard, A. B., Eaton, J., Jensen, J. B. & Kortum, S. (2003), ‘Plants and productivity in
international trade’, American Economic Review 93(4), 1268–1290.
Brown, J. D., Earle, J. S. & Telegdy, A. (2006), ‘The productivity effects of privatization:
Longitudinal estimates from hungary, romania, russia, and ukraine’, Journal of Political
Economy 114(1), 61–99.
Caves, R. (1974), ‘Multinational firms, competition, and productivity in host-country mar-
kets’, Economica 41(162), 176–193.
De Blas, B. & Russ, K. N. (2010), ‘Understanding markups in the open economy’, (forth-
coming) American Economic Journal–Macroeconomics .
De Blas, B. & Russ, K. N. (2013a), ‘All banks great, small, and global: Loan pricing and
foreign competition’, International Review of Economics and Finance 26(1), 4 – 24.
De Blas, B. & Russ, K. N. (2013b), ‘Hymer’s multinationals’, Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization 94, 381–392.
De Loecker, J. & Warzynski, F. (2012), ‘Markups and firm-level export status’, American
Economic Review 102(6), 2437–71.
35
Dixit, A. K. & Stiglitz, J. E. (1977), ‘Monopolistic competition and optimum product diver-
sity’, The American Economic Review 67(3), pp. 297–308.
Frigyik, B. A., Kapila, A. & Gupta, M. R. (2010), ‘Introduction to the dirichlet distribution
and related processes’, UWEE Technical Report UMWEETR-2010 0006.
Garetto, S. (2012), ‘Firms’ heterogeneity and incomplete pass-through’, Manuscript, Boston
University .
Helpman, E., Melitz, M. J. & Yeaple, S. R. (2004), ‘Export versus fdi with heterogeneous
firms’, American Economic Review 94(1), 300–316.
Hymer, S. H. (1976), ‘The international operations of national firms: A study of foreign
direct investment.’, The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA .
Johnson, N. L. & Kotz, S. (1972), Distributions in Statistics, John Wiley & Sons Inc., chapter
Chapter 40: Multivariate Beta and Gamma Distributions, pp. 231–240.
Johnson, N. L., Kotz, S. & Balakrishnan, N. (1995), Continuous Univariate Distributions
Volume 2, John Wiley & Sons Inc., chapter Chapter 3: Beta Distributions, pp. 210–275.
Kleinert, J., Martin, J. & Toubal, F. (2012), ‘The few leading the many: Foreign affiliates
and business cycle comovement’, CEPR Discussion Paper 9129.
Kucheryavyy, K. (2012), ‘Continuity of a model with a nested ces utility function and
bertrand competition’, Economics Letters 117(2), 473–476.
Leemis, L. M. & McQueston, J. T. (2008), ‘Univariate distribution relationships’, Economics
Letters 62(1), 45–51.
Melitz, M. J. & Ottaviano, G. I. P. (2008), ‘Market size, trade, and productivity’, The Review
of Economic Studies 75(1), 295–316.
36
Mra`zo`va, M. & Neary, J. P. (2013), ‘Selection effects with heterogeneous firms’, CEPR Dis-
cussion Paper 9288.
Neary, J. P. (2007), ‘Cross-border mergers as instruments of comparative advantage’, The
Review of Economic Studies 74(4), 1229–1257.
Nocke, V. & Yeaple, S. (2007), ‘Cross-border mergers and acquisitions vs. greenfield foreign
direct investment: The role of firm heterogeneity’, Journal of International Economics
72(2), 336 – 365.
Ramondo, N. & Rappoport, V. (2010), ‘The role of multinational production in a risky
environment’, Journal of International Economics 81(2), 240 – 252.
Rodriguez-Lopez, J. A. (2013), ‘Prices and exchange rates: A theory of disconnect’, Review
of Economic Studies 78(3), 1135 – 1177.
Russ, K. (2007), ‘The endogeneity of the exchange rate as a determinant of fdi: A model of
money, entry, and multinational firms’, Journal of International Economics 71(2), 344–
372.
Sembenelli, A. & Siotis, G. (2008), ‘Foreign direct investment and mark-up dynamics: Evi-
dence from spanish firms’, Journal of International Economics 76(1), 107 – 115.
Temouri, Y., Driffield, N. L. & Higon, D. A. (2008), ‘Analysis of productivity differences
among foreign and domestic firms: Evidence from germany’, Review of World Economics
144(1), 32–54.
37
